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Abstract  
 
The relative standard deviation (RSD) measure of league parity is persistently higher for the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) than the other three major sports leagues in North 
America. This anomaly spans the last three decades and is not explained by differences in league 
distributions of revenue, payroll or local market characteristics, placing the standard model of the 
professional sports league in question. The argument that a short supply of tall players is one 
possible explanation, but we offer a more attractive explanation. With a much greater number of 
scoring attempts in each game, basketball reduces the influence of random outcomes in the 
number of points scored per game and also season winning percentage. Our simulations 
demonstrate that lesser parity in the NBA is inherent in the rules of the game so that inter-league 
comparisons must be interpreted carefully. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The most common statistical measure of league parity is the relative standard deviation (RSD) 
that is the ratio of the standard deviation of winning percentages to the idealized standard 
deviation (ISD).
1
 Some scholars have questioned the accuracy of the RSD, however it is the most 
common statistic and is simple to compute, so we use it here. The RSD's for the last three decades 
for the four professional leagues in North America are given in Table 1.
2
  
 
Baseball's American League (AL) has experienced a movement away from parity in the last decade 
while the National League (NL) has not. The National Hockey League (NHL) moved towards 
parity consistently over the last three decades while the National Football League (NFL) has 
maintained the lowest RSD over the same three decades with little change. Baseball and the NFL 
use very similar revenue sharing systems and the NFL uses a hard salary cap. The NHL adopted a 
hard salary cap in its 2005 collective bargaining agreement to further improve parity. The most 
striking result from Table 1 is the lack of parity in the National Basketball Association (NBA) that 
has remained consistent over the last three decades. Despite modest efforts by the NBA to 
improve parity with its soft salary cap system adopted in 1984, the league still remains head and 
shoulders above the other three leagues in terms of RSD. We refer to this lack of parity as the 
NBA anomaly but we are not the first in the literature to note it.  
 
Table 2 presents the proportion of winning percentages for two decades that fall within and 
                                                          
1
 Cain and Haddock (2006) question the use of the RSD when ties are possible while Fort (2007) dismisses the issue. 
Trandel and Maxcy (2011) formulate an adjusted RSD that takes into account home advantage that is novel but 
difficult to compute. Humphreys (2002) provides a review of earlier work. 
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 Calculated as √           ⁄ where N is the number of regular season games each club plays. 
outside a parity range. The parity range is calculated by computing the average winning 
percentage for each decade for each league, then using the average to calculate the idealized 
standard deviation rather than w = 0.5. The parity range is defined to be plus or minus one ISD 
from the average winning percentage. The NBA stands out as a league with the haves and 
have-not teams with far less clubs falling within the parity range than the other four leagues. 
 
Berri et al (2005) explain the NBA anomaly by referring to an human evolution argument that 
successful teams in the NBA rely on more tall players than unsuccessful teams. The shortage of 
supply of very tall players (say greater than or equal to seven feet tall) generates a competitive 
imbalance that can only be improved by finding more scarce tall players. There is no doubt that 
very tall players are in short supply but the authors do not formally connect this empirical fact 
with the RSD for the NBA. Certainly the other three professional leagues face scarcities as well 
in the supply of certain types of players. In hockey and football, players who possess a 
combination of size, weight and speed are scarce (Alex Ovechkin in the NHL and Calvin 
Johnson in the NFL for instance) and the teams that have them tend to be winners. As there is 
little physical contact, baseball relies more on a combination of strength, coordination and 
speed to define very talented players, of which there are not many.  
 
In this paper, we offer an alternative explanation for the difference in the parity ratios in Table 1 
and the NBA anomaly. Like Berri et al (2005), our explanation does not rely on any business 
practices that are used to redistribute revenues among clubs or affect individual salaries and team 
payrolls, rather it is something that is inherent in the game of basketball: the high number of 
scoring attempts relative to the other three sports. Other explanations should be dispelled with 
first however. The standard two-team league model known so well in the sports economics 
literature predicts that difference in market sizes are a contributing factor to winning percentages 
and league parity. These could lead to differences in payrolls and revenues that drive the NBA 
anomaly result. Greater variability in the distributions of these factors could be important factors. 
Dobson and Goddard (2004) found that an increasing variance in the distribution of club revenues 
coincided with declining parity in the English Football Association over the period 1926-99. If 
the distributions of market sizes are fairly similar across the four leagues, some other force must 
be at work to generate the differences in parity we observe in Table 1, particularly for the NBA.  
 
II. REVENUES 
 
The revenues that drive the two-team league model that result in winning percentages that 
differ from parity are local revenues, mostly gate revenue, but also suite revenue, concessions, 
parking and local media. National revenues tend to be shared equally among all the clubs 
within a league and thus should not affect parity within the league. These types of revenues 
include national media, apparel, merchandising, logos, etc. All of these revenues are shared 
equally in MLB, NFL, NBA and NHL. Differences in local revenues can be significant within 
a league. Table 2 computes the average revenue and standard deviation of revenue for each of 
the four North American leagues based on estimates of club revenues obtained from various 
issues of Forbes magazine. These estimates include local revenues that are redistributed under 
the revenue sharing agreements for MLB and the NFL.  
 
Revenue sharing will reduce the differences in net local revenues as they are designed to do so. 
If club owners are forward looking, they will anticipate their net revenue after revenue sharing 
and base their economic decisions on that net revenue, not revenue before sharing. Economic 
theory suggests that revenue sharing will not affect parity under fairly general conditions (Fort 
and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (2009)), but there is disagreement in the literature. Kesenne (2000) 
finds that revenue sharing will improve league parity whether the club owner is a profit-
maximizer or a win-maximizer while Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) find that increased gate 
revenue sharing worsens parity. The same author in Kesenne (2005) finds that revenue sharing 
worsens parity for profit-maximizers and improves parity for win- maximizers. Feess and 
Stahler (2009) find that revenue sharing improves parity if only absolute talent determines club 
revenue, but worsens parity if relative talent determines club revenue. Dietl and Lang (2008) 
find that revenue sharing worsens league parity. If clubs face differing marginal costs of talent 
that are increasing in talent, Cavagnac (2009) finds that revenue sharing improves league parity. 
Finally, Grossman, Dietl and Trinker (2008) find that revenue sharing reduces league parity but 
the effect is reduced the greater the elasticity of talent supply. Hamlin (2007) points out that 
suite and premium seating revenue is not shared in the NFL and that this could lead towards a 
substitution towards installing more premium seating and lessen parity. This is certainly 
testable, however it does not change the fact that the NFL has more parity than any of the other 
three professional leagues in North America by a wide margin.  
 
Whether and how revenue sharing affects league parity has not been settled in the theoretical 
literature. The choice of the contest success function and the assumptions of talent supply 
determine the result, so general results do not seem to exist. Few empirical studies exist on the 
effects of revenue sharing on league parity. Solow and Krautmann (2007) consider the changes 
to revenue sharing system in MLB over the 1998-2002 period and find that more extensive 
revenue sharing did not significantly affect league parity. Maxcy (2009) finds that more 
extensive revenue sharing adopted in 1997 in MLB worsened parity due to the effectively 
higher marginal tax rate paid by smaller market clubs, while Rockerbie (2012) considers the 
2007 change in revenue sharing in MLB and finds no significant effect on league parity.  
 
Although this paper does not offer any theoretical or empirical insights into the revenue sharing 
debate, it is important to consider whether the revenues reported in Table 2 should be adjusted to 
give pre-revenue sharing figures or not in order to make comparisons with the RSD for each 
league reported in Table 1. Revenue sharing in the NFL and MLB will reduce their standard 
deviations of revenue relative to the NBA and NHL that do not use revenue sharing extensively.
3
 
Even though the empirical evidence suggests that revenue sharing does not affect parity, it will 
distort the revenue figures for comparisons across the four leagues. However trying to obtain local 
revenues before revenue sharing is difficult for enough years to make the comparison useful. Pre-
revenue sharing figures can be estimated by "backing out" the revenue sharing formula each 
league uses - not too difficult for the NFL and MLB, but extremely difficult for the NHL.
4
 
 
In the final analysis, there is no doubt that revenue sharing will reduce the variance of the 
league distribution of revenues, however a number of papers in the theoretical literature 
                                                          
3
 The NBA and NHL share national revenues, like their NFL and MLB counterparts. The payroll tax system used in 
the NBA redistributes salary cap overages to clubs whose payroll falls under the soft salary cap if the total league 
payroll exceeds an allowable percentage of league revenues, but this is not tied to local revenue. The NHL uses a 
similar cap redistribution system. 
4
 The NHL adopted revenue sharing in the 2005 CBA. A club qualifies for receiving a full revenue subsidy (about 
$10 million) if it falls in the lower half of the league revenue distribution, operates in a market of less than 2.5 
million TV households and averages at least 14,000 tickets per regular season game. Falling short of some of these 
requirements means a lower subsidy. All six Canadian clubs are exempt from receiving payments regardless of 
whether they qualify. Clubs classified as "northern U.S. clubs" are also exempt. The amount of monies actually 
transferred is not publicized, but it is not thought to be large. The NBA adopted a revenue sharing plan in its 2012 
CBA but that will not affect the sample period used in this paper. 
suggest that this will not affect the variance of the league distribution of winning 
percentages with some caveats. The empirical literature seems to confirm this result, 
although more extensive work is needed. Hence we use estimates of total revenues in the 
rest of the paper as these are easily available and have been shown to have an acceptable 
degree of accuracy (Rockerbie (2012)). Forward-looking club owners will form an 
expectation of revenues from all sources after the various revenue sharing plans have had 
their redistributive effects, hence it is these revenues that will drive their business 
operations. Krautmann (2009) uses the same reasoning to justify utilizing total revenue in 
the revenue function rather than just local revenue and we do the same here. 
 
The mean revenue, standard deviation of revenue and coefficient of variation (CV) is calculated 
in Table 3 for each league
5
 for the two decades where revenue estimates exist. These were 
computed for each season and then averaged over each decade. Due to the effect of the New 
York Yankees high revenue, the AL numbers are presented with and without the Yankees in the 
sample. The NBA has the highest CV, followed by the NHL, MLB and the NFL. The NFL has 
the rather novel feature that it had the highest average net revenue of the four leagues and the 
lowest CV. The NFL relies greatly on national revenues that are split evenly among all of the 
clubs - more so than the other three leagues. National revenues can serve to reduce the volatility 
of net revenues when they are a large share of total revenue. The NFL and MLB also use revenue 
sharing for local revenues that are largely composed of gate revenue.  
 
Table 1 suggests that parity has improved for the professional sports leagues in North America 
since the 1990-99 decade, with the exception of the AL in baseball (unless the Yankees are 
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 The 2004-05 NHL season was not played due to a labour dispute. 
excluded). This is broadly matched by a reduction in the variance of total revenue for the leagues 
evidenced in Table 3. This seems to fit well with the prediction of the standard two-team league 
model that less variability in revenue (marginal revenue in particular) should be accompanied by 
less variability in winning percentages and hence a movement towards parity in each league. 
However the interleague comparisons do not show any clear association between revenue 
variability and parity. A ranking of the CV's would have the NFL with the lowest revenue 
variability over the last two decades, followed by baseball's NL and AL (excluding the Yankees), 
the NBA and lastly the NHL. However the CV's for the 2000-09 decade do not differ by much 
between leagues making any ranking less informative. The NL and AL have CV's that are 
significantly greater than the NFL at 95% confidence while the CV for the NFL is significantly 
below the CV's for the NHL, NBA and MLB at 95% confidence.
6
 
 
III. PAYROLLS 
 
The NFL has been using a hard salary cap system since 1992 while the NBA introduced a soft 
salary cap system in 1984. The NFL adopted a hard salary cap system in 2005. MLB has yet 
to adopt a salary cap system, rather it uses a competitive balance tax that is fairly ineffective at 
influencing club payrolls. The standard competitive league model predicts that a hard salary 
cap system will move the league towards parity as clubs are forced to maintain similar 
payrolls. This should reduce the RSD for leagues that maintain salary caps relative to those 
that do not despite unexpected shocks to club revenues. Table 1 suggests mixed results based 
on casual observation. The NFL salary cap had little if any effect on its RSD over the last two 
decades, while the soft cap system adopted by the NBA had no effect on its RSD over the last 
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 Reh and Scheffler (1996) provide a table of critical values for the test. 
three decades. The NHL did experience a reduction in its RSD in the last decade, although 
attributing it to the salary cap completely is speculative. Both the NL and AL have CV's that 
are significantly greater than the NBA, NHL and NFL at 95% confidence while the CV for the 
NFL is significantly below the CV's for the NHL, NBA and MLB at 95% confidence. 
 
Looking at the inter-league comparisons, the NFL and NHL with their hard salary caps have 
achieved much greater parity than MLB and the NBA, although the NFL already had much 
greater parity before the introduction of its hard cap in 1992. The outlier again is the NBA - its 
lack of parity in winning percentage compared to the other three leagues is at odds with its soft 
salary cap system. Considering differences in the distributions of league payrolls makes the 
results even more puzzling. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. Over the last decade, 
the NFL, NBA and NHL have achieved very similar CV's and much lower than MLB. The 
NHL is particularly striking given that its CV for the 2000- 2001 to 2003-2004 seasons before 
the strike season of 2004-05 is 0.332 and drops to a very low 0.148 after the strike season when 
the new hard salary cap system was adopted.  
 
Based on the relative variability of payrolls, MLB should have the least parity in winning 
percentage, followed together by the NBA and NHL with the NFL having the most parity. Yet 
the NBA dominates the other leagues in RSD with MLB falling a distant second and the NHL 
and NFL bringing up the rear (most parity). 
 
IV. MARKET FACTORS 
 
Local market characteristics also determine the MRP schedule for each club in a league by 
influencing the demand for tickets and other club products. Differences in the distribution of 
market sizes across leagues could explain the behavior of the RSDs. To investigate, we collected 
data for real income and population of the local metropolitan area and computed the coefficient of 
variation for each league for the last decade. These are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Metropolitan 
area population and income were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional accounts 
(http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/) and cover the largest economic area for each city. 
Metropolitan area population and income figures for Canadian cities were taken and interpolated
7
 
from Statistics Canada (http://www.citypopulation.de/Canada- MetroEst.html and 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/censusrecensement/2006/ respectively). 
 
Income and population are strongly associated measures of market size so the numbers in Tables 
5 and 6 tell the same story. There is nothing unusual about the distribution of city populations 
and incomes in the NBA compared to the other leagues - nothing significant enough to suggest 
that the NBA should have lower parity than the other leagues, despite a significant number of 
new expansion clubs and relocations. 
 
V. INTRINSIC DIFFERENCES 
 
Basketball is played differently in many ways from hockey, baseball and football, but perhaps the 
most striking difference is the number of scoring opportunities. Without a goalkeeper to stop 
shots from scoring points (as in the NHL), successful shot attempts are as frequent as a 24 second 
shot clock will allow in the NBA. Scoring attempts are harder to define in MLB and the NFL but 
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 Canadian population and total income estimates were only available from census data for the years 2002 and 2007. 
Estimates of the full 2000-2009 sample were obtained by assuming the same growth rates between the years 2002 
and 2007. 
the lack of scoring compared to the NBA suggests that legitimate scoring attempts are far fewer. 
The comparison is the easiest for the NBA and NHL as scoring attempts are defined similarly as 
field goals and shots on goal respectively. In both cases, defending players attempt to prevent 
scoring opportunities without committing fouls or penalties. In the NBA, points can be scored by 
sinking a field goal, free-throw or three-point shot, whilst only point can be scored in any shot in 
the NHL. 
 
In what follows, we will show that the NBA parity anomaly could be the result of the large 
number of scoring attempts giving rise to a limit theorem effect. More scoring attempts will tend 
to reduce the variance of points scored around a mean value that is determined by the quality of 
the players on each of the competing clubs. This will result in each club moving towards its 
“true” winning percentage with much less random variation (upsets). For given initial 
distributions of winning percentages, the NBA distribution will display a smaller standard 
deviation than the NHL’s due to a larger number of scoring attempts in each game. The average 
number of shots in the NBA for the 2010-11 season is as follows: 2 point field goals = 80, 3 point 
field goals = 18, free throws = 24. The average number of shots per game in the NHL for the 
2010-11 season is only 30 for each club. 
 
A scoring attempt in the NBA or NHL possesses an expected number of points based on the 
number of points if the shot is successful and the probability of success, estimated by a scoring 
percentage. If we consider a two-point field goal in the NBA, the actual number of points scored 
in a scoring attempt by team j is the expected value plus a random error term that we assume is 
normally distributed with a known variance. 
    (  )                     (1) 
    (    
 )           (2) 
 
The actual number of points scored for each scoring opportunity in the NHL is defined the same 
as (1) with the exception that the expected number of points is just   . The greater the number of 
shots, the more the random errors will tend to cancel each other out and the total number of points 
scored in a game will approach the number of shots multiplied by the team scoring percentage 
(calculated over an entire season). Fewer upsets will be observed – the winning team will tend to 
be the one with the higher scoring percentage. 
 
We performed a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the winning percentage distributions for the 
NBA and the NHL over many hypothetical seasons. Scoring percentages for each type of shot 
were obtained for each club in both leagues for the 2010-11 season while we used the average 
number of shots across all teams in each league. We also calculated the standard deviation of 
each scoring percentage from game to game for each type of shot to calibrate the random shocks. 
The simulation required each team to play a balanced schedule (each team plays each other team 
the same number of times) that is not representative of the NBA or the NHL but much easier to 
implement. Each team in the simulation plays each other team three times for an 87 game 
schedule with 30 teams, close to the 82 game schedules of the NBA and NHL. The winner of 
each contest is the one with the higher point total at the end of the game where a random shock is 
generated for each team. The total number of wins for a season then determines the winning 
percentage.  
 We performed simulations over 50 hypothetical seasons with the results displayed in histogram 
form in Figures 1 and 2.
8
 The results clearly demonstrate that the NBA has less parity than the 
NHL (                         ), however this is not conclusive evidence as this 
merely approximates the levels of parity between the two leagues for the 2010-11 seasons. As a 
further test, the number of scoring opportunities for the NBA was reduced in half for all types of 
shots (40 field goals, 9 three point shots and 12 free throws) while leaving all other parameters 
unchanged and the simulation was re-run for another 50 seasons. The resulting value of      
        indicates that parity improved for the hypothetical NBA league with fewer scoring 
opportunities. This result was consistent in repeated simulations. As a further check, the number 
of shot attempts in an NHL game was increased from 30 to 60 shots for each team and the 
simulation was re-run over 50 seasons. The simulation generated              with a similar 
result over repeated simulations. Parity in the hypothetical NHL worsened with more scoring 
attempts. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The short supply of tall people is certainly a feature of the NBA but it is not clear that it is the 
only explanation for the NBA anomaly. The standard two-team competitive equilibrium model of 
a professional sports league predicts that market factors play a large role in determining season 
outcomes and league parity. Our analysis of market factors for the four professional sports 
leagues in North America suggests little evidence for this as an explanation of the NBA anomaly. 
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 The simulation program is available upon request to the author. 
This paper has shown that a sort of limit theorem result could be a better explanation. The greater 
number of scoring attempts in basketball mitigates the uncertainty in the total number of baskets 
scored to a much greater extent than goals in hockey, runs in baseball or touchdowns in football. 
Fewer upsets will be observed in basketball as random chance plays a much lesser role in the 
outcome of each contest. Teams will come much closer to their “true” winning percentages based 
on their own stocks of talent even if we impose that the prior distribution of true winning 
percentages is the same in each of the four leagues. The distribution of winning percentages for 
the NBA will then display a higher RSD than the other three professional leagues.  
 
We demonstrate this argument using simulations for the NBA and NHL using data from their 
2010-11 seasons to calibrate the model. The simulations generated an RSD for the NBA nearly 
twice the value for the NHL. Decreasing the number of scoring attempts by half reduced the RSD 
for the NBA markedly, while doubling the number of scoring attempts in the NHL increased its 
RSD significantly.  
 
If the NBA seriously wishes to improve parity (it is not clear that greater parity is a league 
objective), we offer an alternative method to revenue sharing and salary caps: reduce the number 
of scoring opportunities. Prior to the 1954-55 NBA season, the league had no 24-second clock so 
that scoring attempts were less frequent.
9
 The lowest recorded score in NBA history occurred in 
1950 when the Fort Wayne Pistons defeated the Minneapolis Lakers by the score of 19 – 18. We 
don’t recommend a return to boring basketball, however an increase in the shot clock from 24 to 
perhaps 40 seconds could reduce the number of scoring opportunities and increase the influence 
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 A good review of the history of the shot clock in the NBA can be found at 
http://www.nba.com/analysis/00422949.html 
of random outcomes. Parity would be improved at little cost with the exception of fans screaming 
for more entertaining basketball and the potential for lost revenues. In the end, maybe this is not 
such a good idea. 
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 Table 1. Relative standard deviations 
 ISD 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 
National League (NL) 0.039824  1.753  1.739  2.026  
American League (AL) 0.039824  1.687  1.757  1.683  
National Basketball Association (NBA) 0.05522  2.766  2.909  2.726  
National Hockey League (NHL) 0.05522  2.040  1.829  1.606  
National Football League (NFL) 0.125  1.506  1.502  1.581  
Data sources are listed in an appendix. 
 
  
 Table 2. Frequency of winning percentages (%) 
 
 1990-99 2000-09 
 w < 0.5-ISD 0.5±ISD w > 0.5+ISD w < 0.5-ISD 0.5±ISD w > 0.5+ISD 
NL 30.8  40.4  28.8  31.3  38.1  30.6  
AL 26.9  44.6  28.5  32.3  33.1  34.6  
NBA 38.7  21.3  40.0  35.4  28.0  36.6  
NHL 27.6  41.2  31.2  30.3  41.5  28.2  
NFL 28.8  47.3  23.9  30.0  45.5  24.5  
 
  
 Table 3. Statistics for total revenue ($ millions) 
  1990-99 2000-09 
AL Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
65.0  
23.4  
0.352  
156.6  
57.7 
0.368 
AL (Yankees excluded) Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
62.1  
20.3  
0.315 
145.9  
40.5  
0.278 
NL Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
60.3  
17.4  
0.283 
152.3  
41.3  
0.271 
NBA Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
50.0 
14.8  
0.297 
106.9  
26.3  
0.246 
NHL Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
36.7  
11.3  
0.313 
79.7 
20.4  
0.255 
NFL Mean revenue 
Standard deviation 
CV 
73.0  
9.8  
0.128 
188.0  
26.2  
0.140 
 
  
 Table 4. Statistics for total payroll ($ millions) 
  1990-99 2000-09 
AL Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
34.5  
11.5 
0.322  
78.2  
37.6 
0.481 
AL (Yankees excluded) Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
33.2  
10.8  
0.316 
70.8  
26.8  
0.384 
NL Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
32.1  
10.5  
0.312 
72.6  
24.2  
0.334 
NBA Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
26.4 
6.0  
0.220 
62.7  
12.5  
0.200 
NHL Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
17.3  
4.7  
0.261 
45.2 
9.2 
0.207 
NFL Mean payroll 
Standard deviation 
CV 
39.9  
5.2  
0.135 
102.4 
10.6  
0.106 
 
  
 Table 5. Statistics for total metropolitan area population 
  1990-99 2000-09 
AL Mean population 
Standard deviation 
CV 
8080938 
5733641 
0.710 
8326536 
5870017 
0.705 
NL Mean population 
Standard deviation 
CV 
6740198 
6006156 
0.891 
719888 
5914975 
0.822 
NBA Mean population 
Standard deviation 
CV 
6772059 
5727114 
0.846 
7391602 
6129035 
0.829 
NHL Mean population 
Standard deviation 
CV 
7038367 
7030098 
0.999 
7435963 
6835450 
0.919 
NFL Mean population 
Standard deviation 
CV 
5520457 
4864747 
0.881 
6082885 
5174622 
0.851 
 
  
 Table 6. Statistics for total metropolitan area income ($ billions) 
  1990-99 2000-09 
AL Mean income 
Standard deviation 
CV 
20.9 
16.4 
0.788 
34.3 
26.9 
0.764 
NL Mean income 
Standard deviation 
CV 
17.9 
17.1 
0.952 
28.4 
26.7 
0.941 
NBA Mean income 
Standard deviation 
CV 
17.6 
16.8 
0.955 
30.7 
27.9 
0.909 
NHL Mean income 
Standard deviation 
CV 
18.7 
20.3 
1.083 
30.3 
32.6 
1.076 
NFL Mean income 
Standard deviation 
CV 
14.7 
15.2 
1.032 
24.2 
24.9 
1.029 
 
  
 Figure 1. Winning percentage distribution for NBA for 50 seasons 
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 Figure 2. Winning percentage distribution for NHL for 50 seasons 
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